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Imagining Peace:  
The Role of Historical Narratives 
in the Bosnian Peace Process
Rose Ramos
           
            Though memoirs about the events surrounding the wars of secession that led 
to the breakup of the former Republic of Yugoslavia have proliferated within the last 
five or six years, two such personal narratives stand out because of their 
documentation of the long and difficult peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina:  David 
Owen's Balkan Odyssey and Richard Holbrooke's To End a War.   The memoirs of 
both David Owen, the European Union's representative to and Co-Chairman of the 
Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICFY) and the co-author of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, and Richard Holbrooke, 
the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs and architect of 
the Dayton Peace Accords, reveal very different approaches to finding a peaceful 
solution to the war. I would like to suggest that the narratives that these key 
negotiators in the peace process read and ascribed to influenced the ways in which 
they imagined peace, how they carried out negotiations, and the eventual shape of 
their proposed plans for peace.  It is through these narratives that we see Trickster at 
work in this peace process. This paper examines Owen's Balkan Odyssey and 
Holbrooke's To End a War to determine the Trickster’s role in the extent to which 
particular historical narratives may have influenced their ability to imagine a plan for 
peace in   Bosnia  .
Not unexpectedly, their memoirs name some of the same histories.  Rebecca 
West's Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, published in 1941, appears in both books, as 
does Robert Kaplan's Balkan Ghosts, published in 1993.  Both of these histories, 
dressed up as travel narratives, hold to the view that the Balkans are an essentially 
violent and incomprehensible place where ethnic divisions are deep, memories are 
long, and differences are unbridgeable.  Noel Malcolm's Bosnia:  A Short History, 
published in 1994, appears only in Holbrooke's book, and it takes a less pessimistic 
view.  For Malcolm, ethnic conflict is a part of Bosnian history, but there is nothing 
inevitable, impenetrable, or innate about it. 
To begin with one of the books that Owen and Holbrooke have in common, 
Rebecca West's Black Lamb and Grey Falcon has by turns been praised as an epic 
masterpiece of travel writing, war propaganda, history, and psychoanalysis and 
derided as a moralistic, racist, pro-Serb treatment of Yugoslav history.  Sweeping in 
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has achieved legendary status as one of the definitive sources on Yugoslavia , and 
its influence on contemporary perceptions of the region, however indirect, is 
far-reaching.  As journalist (and fellow travel writer) Brian Hall notes in a 1996 
article about West for The New Yorker, "For English and American journalists who 
write about the region, the book dominates all other secondary sources" (76).  
According to Hall, the book was originally published to critical acclaim and sold 
respectably well, but after World War II, it became a work that "everyone had heard 
of…but few had read" (74). 
            During the wars that led to the eventual breakup of   Yugoslavia  in the 
1990s, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon began selling in large numbers again as 
journalists, diplomats, academics, and laypeople alike tried to understand the rapid 
dissolution of the former  Republic of  Yugoslavia  .  According to Hall, 21,000 
thousand copies were sold in the  U.S.  alone between 1993 and 1996 (76).  Black 
Lamb and Grey Falcon's appeal is understandable.  West's compelling prose is 
expressive, passionate, and dramatic in its descriptions of the historical, physical, and 
psychological landscape of the Balkans.  As yet another influential journalist and 
travel writer Robert Kaplan ecstatically writes in Balkan Ghosts:  A Journey Through 
History: 
Black Lamb and Grey Falcon is, like   Yugoslavia  , a sprawling world unto 
itself:  a two-volume, half-a-million word encyclopedic inventory of a 
country; a dynastic saga of the Habsburgs and the Karageorgevitches; a 
scholarly thesis on Byzantine archaeology, pagan folklore, and Christian and 
Islamic philosophy.  The book also offers a breathtaking psychoanalysis of 
the German mind and of the nineteenth-century origins of fascism and 
terrorism.  It was a warning, of near-perfect clairvoyance, of the danger that 
totalitarianism posed to Europe in the 1940s and beyond (4). 
The appeal of West's book comes from this kind of comprehensive approach.  Black 
Lamb and Grey Falcon is "the work in which Rebecca West formulated her views 
on religion, ethics, art, myth, and gender" (Glendinning 164) set against the violent 
backdrop of   Yugoslavia  . It is also a work which does the work of Trickster in the 
formulation of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. 
West begins Black Lamb and Grey Falcon with a justification of its subject, a 
narrative of how her need to write about  Yugoslavia  came about.  She reveals that 
she was in the hospital recovering from surgery when she hears news of the 
assassination of the King of Yugoslavia in the streets of  Marseilles  .  Upon hearing 
this news, it seems to her "inevitable that war must follow" (2), and it would have, 
she believes, if the Yugoslavian government had not maintained strict control over its 
population and refrained from any reaction that would have provoked its enemies.  
Explaining to an uncomprehending nurse that "assassinations lead to other things," 
she grows exasperated and apprehensive:  "I sighed, for when I came to look back on 
it my life had been punctuated by the slaughter of royalties, by the shouting of 
newsboys who have run down the streets to tell me that someone has used a lethal 
weapon to turn over a new leaf in the book of history" (3).
            Couching Balkan history between these political assassinations, West 
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describes the Slavs as "a people, quarrelsome, courageous, artistic, intellectual, and 
profoundly perplexing to other peoples, who came from  Asia into the  Balkan 
Peninsula early in the Christian era and were Christianized by Byzantine influence" 
(4).  After this time, "they founded violent and magnificent kingdoms of infinite 
promise in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Bosnia, but these were overthrown when the Turks 
invaded Europe in the fourteenth century…"(4).  The Slavs on the western borders of 
the  Balkan Peninsula , West continues, were oppressed by the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire "largely because the German-Austrians felt a violent, instinctive loathing of 
all Slavs and particularly the Czechs, whose great intelligence and ability made them 
dangerous competitors in the labour market" (5).  She goes on to explain how 
Austria-Hungary had oppressed the people of Serbia and Bulgaria, who had 
overthrown the Turks in the nineteenth century, and "tried with especial venom to 
destroy their languages, and created for themselves an increasing amount of internal 
disorder which all sane men saw to carry a threat of disruption" (5).  Violence as a 
response to political, social, and economic oppression in the region is not only a 
natural response by the Slavs; it is also, for West the rational response.  It is 
"impossible to think of the Balkans as gentle and lamb-like" (21), she concludes after 
her brief Yugoslav history lesson.  In West's view, violence as a means of resolving 
conflict, particularly those of a political nature, is simply the Balkan way.
            As troubling as her stereotypical vision of the Balkans as an inherently violent 
place, her equally disconcerting pro-Serb bias is evident throughout her narrative.  
She sees in modern   Belgrade  "a conscious attempt to restore the glories of the 
medieval Serbian Empire….The memory of the Nemanyas and their wealth and 
culture was kept alive among the peasants, partly by the Orthodox Church, which 
very properly never ceased to remind them that they had once formed a free and 
Christian state" (519).   The Serb national ballads also kept alive the memory of the 
Serbian Empire.  These collectively composed poems contained:
the full force of the artistic genius of the nation, denied all other outlet….and 
the late eighteenth century, which marked the decline of the folk song in the 
West, here brought it new strength, for the nationalist and liberal ideas 
popularized by the French Revolution found their perfect expression 
ready-made in the laments of this enslaved people.  The Serbs who took part 
in the first rising against the Turks in 1804 were, therefore, nothing like 
primitives who were simply revolting against an immediate injustice.  That 
revolt they were making; but also they were the heirs of a highly developed 
civilization, which they intended from the first to create anew (519).  
That West is sympathetic to this re-creation of the Serbian Empire is also seen in her 
extended retelling of the plot to assassinate Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand in   Sarajevo  by Gavrilo Princip that is the central story in the book's 
section on   Bosnia  .  Gavrilo Princip is a tragic figure, a martyr for the cause of 
Serbian nationalism.  Of the assassination itself, West acknowledges that it was an act 
that led to the killing of millions and the mindless destruction of the Great War.  "But 
to those who look at it on the soil where it was committed," she says, "and to the 
lands east of that, it seems a holy act of liberation; and among such people are those 
whom the West would have to admit are wise and civilized" (381).  Moral judgment 
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the more incomprehensible it becomes.  She explains:  "The soul should choose life.  
But when the Bosnians chose life, and murdered Franz Ferdinand, they chose death 
for the French and Germans and English, and if the French and Germans and English 
had been able to choose life they would have chosen death for the Bosnians.  The 
sum will not add up" (382).  Recognizing that the sum does not add up reveals a 
recognition of Trickster-like activity within the Balkan world as viewed by West, 
even though she does not name it as such.
The belief that the Balkans are inherently violent, impossibly complex, and 
morally convoluted is passed on to the many journalists who were trying to 
understand and explain the complexity of the wars that had broken out in the former   
Yugoslavia  in the early 1990s.  One such journalist is Robert Kaplan, who had used 
Black Lamb and Grey Falcon as his guide through   Yugoslavia  .  In fact, in Balkan 
Ghosts he claims, "I would rather have lost my passport and money than my heavily 
thumbed and annotated copy of Black Lamb and Grey Falcon" (8).  He even sees his 
journey through the Balkans as analogous to West's, for just as she had visited 
Yugoslavia to understand the nature of the "looming cataclysm" (8) that was to 
become World War II, so he, too, had come to the region to understand the nature of 
another looming cataclysm in that region as the Cold War was coming to an end.  
"Politics in Yugoslavia," he pessimistically declares, "perfectly mirrors the process of 
history and is thus more predictable than most people think" (8). Perhaps at least 
some of this predictablity is a manifestation of the “transformation of the meaningless 
into the meaningful’ associated with Trickster” (Jung 256).
In Balkan Ghosts, Kaplan, like West, positions the ethnic conflicts that were 
the ostensible cause of the Yugoslav wars of secession in the context of the division 
between the ancient Holy Roman and Byzantine empires and the division between 
the influence of Christian Europe and Muslim Ottoman Turkey on the people of the 
Balkans.  For instance, he discusses the ethnic tension fostered by the exploitative 
practices of the Austro-Hungarians on their Slav subjects.  Revolutionary movements 
against the Habsburgs were put down with mass executions, and divisive plans such 
as giving the Serb minorities in   Croatia  special privileges in order to increase ill 
feelings between the Croats and Serbs.  The Habsburgs, after all, reacted to Bosnian 
Serb separatist, Gavrilo Princip's assassination of Franz Ferdinand by arresting and 
executing hundreds of Orthodox Serb peasants who had nothing to do with the 
assassination.  They then declared war on   Serbia  , which started World War I.  The 
Habsburg empire, Kaplan concludes, came to an end in the same way as the  
Ottoman empire :  "amid a welter of cruelties directed against a host of small nations, 
struggling to break free" (27).  This underscores his thesis that Yugoslav politics 
mirrors its history, and is therefore predictable.
At the end of Balkan Ghosts, Kaplan compares the decline of the Soviet 
Empire with the decline of the Ottoman Empire .  Enver Pasha and the Young Turks 
became Mikhail Gorbechev and his supporters in the Soviet reenactment of the fall of 
the  Ottoman Empire .  They "dictated reform from the top down, hoping to preserve 
the empire, in looser form, through dramatic liberalization," but, Kaplan emphasizes, 
"the plan was overpowered by centrifugal forces that drove subject populations to 
demand full independence; and by fears of people in the streets, who wanted to 
retreat backward into the past rather than to advance forward into the future" (286).  
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The Young Turk Revolution, though, made the Young Turks themselves irrelevant 
like the Soviet reformers, so Ataturk came forward with his vision of a new, compact 
Turkish nation that was free of the responsibility for its empire’s outlying lands 
(286).  A similar contraction, driven by such centrifugal forces would now be 
required to save the Balkans:  "Conflicting ethnic histories, inflamed by the living 
death of Communism, had made the Balkan sky so foul that now, sadly, a storm was 
required to clear it" (287).
Rozen correctly describes Kaplan's dark view of the Balkans as "a place riven 
by such innate, historical and profound ethnic and religious hatreds, that a brutal war 
and ethnic cleansing seem almost inevitable" (online).  This pessimism about the 
region that Black Lamb and Grey Falcon inspired extends beyond the realm of 
journalists and travel writers.  Filtered through the work of contemporary writers, it 
shaped the policy of the  Clinton  administration toward the Balkans in general and 
toward the war in   Bosnia  in particular.  President and Mrs. Clinton, as well as Colin 
Powell (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time) are widely reported to have 
been strongly influenced by Kaplan's Balkan Ghosts, which had been published in 
1993, a year after the fighting had broken out in Bosnia (Rozen, online; Drew 157; 
Holbrooke, 22; Owen, 162).  Elizabeth Drew's account of the   Clinton  presidency 
explains that after reading Kaplan's book, whose overriding theme was that tribal 
differences and ancient ethnic hatreds had been played out for centuries in the 
Balkans, and the barbarity with which those differences were fought out, guaranteed 
that the violent conflict would continue for centuries into the future. President   
Clinton  decided not pursue the policy of lifting the arms embargo against the former 
Yugoslav republics but instead to use air strikes, against the Serb positions on the 
ground to lessen their military advantage, to try to hasten a settlement.  As members 
of   Clinton  's foreign policy team were trying to promote the policy of "lift and 
strike" to the European Union, the President changed his mind about intervening in 
the war.  Les Aspin, then Secretary of Defense, heard the President discussing 
Balkan Ghosts and its claim that "these people had been killing each other for 
centuries" and reported back to his colleagues that the President was "going south on 
this policy.  His heart isn't in it…. We have a serious problem here.  We're out there 
pushing a policy that the President's not comfortable with.  He's not on board" (Drew 
157). Thus, we see West’s text performing the work of  Trickster in two ways: as a 
destabilizing force within the  Clinton  administration and concurrently as a 
stabilizing force in the President’s decision to employ air strikes against the Serbs.
Many critics of the Clinton administration's increasing confused policy on 
Bosnia blamed Kaplan for emphasizing "ancient hatreds" while ignoring the 
significant rates of intermarriage and the sophisticated, non-religious, and multiethnic 
qualities that typified Bosnia and much of the rest of Yugoslavia after World War II.  
Nevertheless when he was writing and reporting the stories that were to become 
Balkan Ghosts, Kaplan's aim was to illustrate the power that the "ghosts" of subdued 
animosities related to historical injustices in the region seemed to have on certain 
segments of the population during the final days of Communism (Rozen, online).  He 
did not intend to be comprehensive.  But by the time the book was published, "It 
mattered that members of a cosmopolitan civilization that lived and breathed and 
supported multiethnicity--a population largely ignored in the book--were being forced 
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carved out through genocide" (Rozen, online).  The region's troubled and violent 
history was important, but was not helpful in finding a solution to the current crisis.  
As Anthony Lake, Clinton's National Security Advisor, stated, "In a policy sense, 
you want to be aware of that, but you look at a mother who's lost a child, and it's cold 
comfort to her that this has been going on for centuries" (qtd. in Drew 143-144).
Kaplan, however, now justifiably claims that he never meant for his book to 
be used as a guide for   U.S.  foreign policy:  "When I was reporting Balkan Ghosts 
in the 1980s, the Balkans were like  Ethiopia  , an obscure country.  The idea that 
any policymaker would read it, I didn't even consider.  I saw it purely as an 
entertaining journalistic travel book about my experiences in the 1980s" (qtd. in 
Rozen, online).  In spite of these claims, Kaplan's conclusion that in the Balkans, 
"men have been isolated by poverty and ethnic rivalry, dooming them to hate" (qtd. 
in Rozen, online), is both undeniable and undeniably reliant on West's interpretation 
of Balkan history in Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, and it clearly affected America's 
policy toward Bosnia during the war. So, West’s text tricks the  U.S.  ’s policy 
through the medium of Kaplan’s travel book, whether Kaplan intended such a 
tricking or not.
The notion that the people of Yugoslavia are condemned to hate each other 
that was put forth by West and advanced by Kaplan not only influenced the policy 
toward the war in Bosnia, but it also played a role in shaping the peace process.  Two 
key negotiators in the peace process that eventually led to the end of the war in   
Bosnia  also had at least a passing familiarity with West's book.  Both Owen and 
Holbrooke refer to West's book in the opening chapters of their memoirs of their 
respective roles in the peace process.  Owen, at the beginning of the war, "had 
dipped into, rather than re-read, Rebecca West's account of her travels through   
Yugoslavia  in the late 1930s.  On every page I had found a labyrinth of history, 
weaving a complexity of human relations that seemed to bedevil the whole region"  
(Owen 6).  That Owen is sympathetic to West's view of Balkan history is evident 
from remarks in his introduction to Balkan Odyssey:
History points to a tradition in the Balkans of a readiness to solve disputes by 
the taking up of arms and acceptance of the forceful or even negotiated 
movement of people as the consequence of war.  It points to a culture of 
violence within a crossroad civilization where three religions, Orthodox 
Christianity, Islam, and Roman Catholicism, have divided communities and 
on occasions become the marks of identification in a dark and virulent 
nationalism (3).
The genocidal acts and forced migration of entire groups of people that were taking 
place in   Bosnia  were simply another episode of violent nationalism in a place 
where such things were a natural, regular feature of history. 
Another example of this attitude occurs when Owen describes the Croatian 
government's attack on the Krajina and the Bosnian Serbs' attacks on Zepa and 
Srebrenica between May and August 1995, as a "Balkan solution" (353).  This 
suggests that once again, this is the way these people do things here:  "A Balkan 
solution had been imposed on the battlefield, tearing up the Contact Group map, 
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destroying the Zagreb 4 plan and raising fundamental questions about the relevance 
of any of the various involvements from outside the region since 1991" (353).  Not 
only is violence against one ethnic group by another the Balkan way, its mere 
existence casts doubt on the relevance of Western involvement in the peace process.  
While Owen does not seem to hold to West's pro-Serb rhetoric (he finds members of 
all three combatant parties despicable and deceitful), he clearly embraces her belief 
that the Balkans is a region doomed to conflict and ethnic hatred and that intervention 
from external powers would likely amount to little, unless that external intervention 
accommodates ethnic divisions.
            This belief is underscored by his criticism of the European Union's early 
decision not to allow changes of the internal borders of the constituent republics of   
Yugoslavia  if those changes could be agreed upon:  "Incomprehensibly, the proposal 
to redraw the republics' boundaries had been rejected by all eleven other EC 
countries" (33).  The insistence of maintaining the internal boundaries would be 
incomprehensible if one listened to the few who wanted to divide the country along 
ethnic lines, but not so incomprehensible to those who had been living along side 
their friends and neighbors in peace for at least two generations. 
The plan to allow changes to the internal borders of   Yugoslavia  had been 
rejected for good reasons.  The boundaries of the republics could not be redrawn to 
any group's satisfaction because there were so many different pockets where an 
ethnic group would have made up the minority of the national population.  Moreover, 
these pockets were not geographically connected.  Such divisions, many argued, 
would have also legitimized the practice of ethnic cleansing, and the patrolling and 
monitoring of so many borders would have been impossible.  Owen, however, 
believes that violence and nationalism are the strongest traditions in the Balkans and 
rejects these reasons.  He cites the "velvet divorce" of the Czech-Slovak separation in 
1993, stating that "there is an alternative to staying locked in a loveless, even 
antagonistic marriage.  All over the world there are peoples who believe that their 
nationality would be better expressed by living in an independent state separate from 
that in which they are living" (33-34).
This metaphor of a multi-ethnic Bosnia as a loveless marriage points to 
Owen's assumptions about the region that are inspired by, or tricked by, West's vision 
of Yugoslavia.  Its turbulent history would lead inexorably to a turbulent future, so 
there is little point in trying to hold the country together in a meaningful way.  
Unsurprisingly, though complying with the EU's guideline that the borders of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina should remain as they were before the war, Owen helped to 
engineer a peace plan that would divide the territory along ethnic lines into ten highly 
autonomous cantons with a weak central government (Silber & Little 276).  The 
Vance-Owen Peace Plan was a "three-part package comprising ten constitutional 
principles, a detailed cessation of hostilities agreement and a map" (Owen 87).  
Willingness to fragment the state in such a fashion and to impose new internal 
borders on the Bosnian population, members of which had intermarried and had lived 
side by side with no regard to ethnic or religious background for two generations, 
parallels West's insistence on the ethnic divisions in Black Lamb and Grey Falcon.  
This reveals Trickster’s masking function; the volatile hatreds are highlighted while 
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Owen disingenuously states that he and Vance were "careful not to label any 
provinces Serb, Croat or Muslim" (90), but on the very next page he talks about how 
"provinces with a clear Serb majority would represent 43 percent of the total land 
area of Bosnia-Herzegovina" (91).  When Bosnian president Izetbegovic rejects the 
map as unprincipled and unacceptable because it legitimized ethnic cleansing and 
essentially prevented the return of refugees, Owen's response is that in an ideal 
situation, "a case could be made for many of his wishes; but in the mess that was then 
Bosnia-Herzegovina his objections, if maintained, represented a totally 
non-negotiable position.  What was more serious was that he probably knew that if 
he persisted, he would destroy the VOPP…" (92).  Once again, in Owen's view, the 
ancient ethnic hatreds in which the region is hopelessly and inherently mired, 
overrides a genuine desire for a multi-ethnic state.
Owen, though, reveals that he is not even convinced of the existence of a 
multi-ethnic culture in  Bosnia  because that identity was developed and established 
under Communism.  "This identity…was sadly never underpinned by 
democracy….There is disagreement as to how well integrated and multi-ethnic its 
peoples' lives had actually become and the evidence is patchy" (38).  It was the 
Sarajevan intellectuals who "wanted the world to know the tolerant side of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina; they were proud that it was the crossroads of civilizations, 
where Muslims, Orthodox and Catholic religions mingled, home to Serbs, Croats, 
Bosnians, Jews and Gypsies" (38).  He claims that it was Bosnia-Herzegovina 
"which inspired…Cyrus Vance and me to try to keep the citizens of this newly 
recognized country together in one state" (38).  Yet two pages later, he says that by 
1992, it was "clear…that the challenge facing us in the ICFY was to devise forms of 
decentralization and autonomy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Croatia and in Kosovo that 
would contain the legitimate nationalism of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian 
Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Kosovar Albanians, and ensure respect for Albanians 
living in Macedonia" (40-41).  At the very least, Owen seems to think of a 
multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina as a dream conjured up by intellectuals.  Curiously, 
he does not seem to acknowledge the possibility that the violent and ethnically 
divided Bosnia-Herzegovina is also a ((Trickster)) fiction conjured up by West, 
Kaplan, and nationalist/separatist propaganda.
In contrast, Holbrooke, in To End a War, while acknowledging the difficult 
and tortured history of ethnic and religious conflict in the Balkans, is less prepared to 
accept West's (and Kaplan's and the nationalist/separatist's) vision of the region:  "It 
was, of course, undeniable that the ethnic groups within Yugoslavia nursed 
deep-seated grievances against one another.  But in and of itself, ethnic friction, no 
matter how serious, did not make the tragedy inevitable--or the three ethnic groups 
equally guilty" (23).  West's Black Lamb and Grey Falcon and Kaplan's Balkan 
Ghosts are, for Holbrooke, merely examples of "bad history," that advanced the 
theory that "'ancient hatreds,' a vague but useful term for history too complicated (or 
trivial) for outsiders to master, made it impossible (or pointless) for anyone outside the 
region to try to prevent the conflict (22).  Western officials and politicians who 
espoused this theory seemed to Holbrooke to use it as an excuse for their own 
hesitation to seek solutions to the problems in the region. Holbrooke seems to 
recognize the Trickster at play in the West text and in doing so, refuses to play along.
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As an antidote to the bad history of West and Kaplan, Holbrooke offers Noel 
Malcolm's Bosnia:  A Short History to his readers and even implies in a footnote that 
had this book appeared earlier, it might have convinced Western leaders to intervene 
in   Bosnia  sooner and more decisively (23).  Unlike Kaplan's book, which was 
"only" a travel narrative, Malcolm's history of   Bosnia  deliberately sets out to 
persuade its readers that  Bosnia  had a distinct history that indeed embraced 
multi-ethnic ideals and that the war that had broken out in 1992 was the result not of 
deeply rooted ethnic hatreds, but of deliberately provocative actions of criminal 
politicians. 
In the introduction to Bosnia:  A Short History, Malcolm explicitly states this 
view:
The history of   Bosnia  itself does not explain the origins of this war.  "The 
biggest obstacle to all understanding of the conflict is the assumption that 
what has happened in that country is the product--natural, spontaneous and at 
the same time necessary--of forces lying within  Bosnia  's own internal 
history.  That is the myth which was carefully propagated by those who 
caused the conflict, who wanted the world to believe that what they and their 
gunmen were doing was not done by them, but by impersonal and inevitable 
historical forces beyond anyone's control (xix).
He does not deny that hatreds and hostility existed in  Bosnia  , but he maintains that 
they were more often attributable to economics than religious or ethnic differences.  
This hostility fluctuated with changing economic conditions and was subject to 
external political pressures (xxi).
According to Malcolm, the supposedly ancient ethnic hatreds were the 
products of history rather than innate features of the Bosnian people.  Economic 
causes of hatred were diminished by reforms in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, and religious causes of hatred were moderated in the second half of the 
twentieth century by general processes of secularization.  "For most of the period 
after 1878, the different religious or ethnic communities in   Bosnia  lived peacefully 
together:  the two major episodes of violence--in and just after the first world war, 
and during the four years of the second world war--were exceptions, induced and 
aggravated by causes outside  Bosnia  's borders.  And since the second of those 
terrible episodes, two whole generations have grown up, the majority of the Bosnian 
population, who have no personal memories of the fighting in that war, and no 
particular desire to revive it" (xxi).
That Holbrooke embraced this version of Bosnian history is illustrated by the 
eventual shape taken by the Dayton Peace Accords, which officially ended the war in  
Bosnia  and of which he is the chief engineer.  Like the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, the 
Dayton Accords did not change the pre-war borders of  Bosnia  .  Rather than 
dividing the territory into ten ethnically defined cantons, Dayton divided the country 
into two regions (the Muslim-Croat Federation with fifty-one percent of the territory 
and the Republika Srpska with forty-nine percent) that were to be joined under a 
central government with a single constitution that would ensure democratic elections 
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human rights (US Dept. of State, online).  Also significant about the agreement is that 
the long-besieged capital city of  Sarajevo  , which became the symbol of 
multiculturalism and tolerance in  Bosnia  throughout the war, remained united in the 
Muslim-Croat Federation, despite the initial desire of the Serbs to divide the city 
between the two entities.  In previous peace plans, including Vance-Owen, the most 
the parties were able to agree upon was placing  Sarajevo  under international 
administration, but the Bosnian government and Holbrooke's team insisted that it 
remain united.  After the negotiations, Haris Silajdžić, the Bosnian prime minister, 
recalled Holbrooke's saying that "we shall not create another Berlin Wall at the end 
of the twentieth century" (qtd. in Silber & Little 371).
Despite these successes, Holbrooke is aware of the problems with the 
agreement, the most serious of which is that it left two opposing armies in one 
country out of necessity because NATO would not agree to disarm the different 
sides.  The partition of the country is also problematic, but less so than strict division 
along ethnic lines, which would have induced mass migration of refugees as minority 
groups would be forced out of their homes.  Migration would have caused violence 
to flare up again over land and houses (363).  Even so, Holbrooke is not against a 
voluntary division of  Bosnia  , as long as it were the wish of a majority of each of 
the three ethnic groups in the country.  Like Owen, he cites the peaceful breakup of  
Czechoslovakia  , but a separation would have to be the result of "elections free of 
intimidation" (emphasis in the original), which simply was not possible after the war 
(364).
This desire of Holbrooke's to keep Bosnia united unless and until the majority 
of the population can decide freely for themselves whether to partition their country is 
in stark contrast to Owen's desire to impose ethnic divisions as a condition of a peace 
plan.  These differences not only, once again, underscore the diverging views of 
nature of Balkan history, but also how Black Lamb and Grey Falcon had performed 
as Trickster in the forging of the Vance Owen Peace Plan. 
Despite initially being subjected to the same descriptions and analyses of the 
Balkans, these two men had very different attitudes and approaches to negotiating a 
peace agreement.  How did simple history lessons lead each of these negotiators to 
different conclusions about what peace in  Bosnia  would look like, about what 
peace in   Bosnia  would even mean, and how the peace process itself should 
unwind? 
The assumption behind these questions is that, simply put, stories matter.  They 
matter because they allow a group of people to imagine their collective identity.  The 
history that contains stories of conquest, colonization, resistance, oppression at the 
hands of the fascist Croat Ustashe, matters to Serbs who believed they had a right to 
"ethnically cleanse" lands occupied by Muslims and Croats in order to create a 
Greater Serbia.  Stories matter to Croats who believed that Bosnian Muslims were 
really Croat Catholics whose ancestors had been forced to convert at the hands of 
Ottoman Turks.  Stories matter even, and perhaps especially, to those who refused to 
identify with a particular ethnic or religious group and who refused to give up on the 
possibility of a multiethnic   Bosnia and Herzegovina  . It is because stories matter, 
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that we must come to terms with the archetypical character of the Trickster. Trickster 
is a regular in a narrative’s cast of characters.  So, we should not be surprised that 
Trickster is at work in the construction of the Bosnian narrative. In the construction of 
this narrative, West’s text is taken into account by Owen and by Holbrooke; 
however, whereas Holbrooke does not allow the negative representations in the text 
to sway him, thus denying Trickster’s power in the Dayton Accords, Owen does 
allow such representation to sway him, promoting Trickster’s power in the Vance 
Owen Peace Plan.
Just as stories matter to those who both fought in and resisted war, stories were 
important to the imagination of the restoration of peace in the region.  Holbrooke is 
no less swayed by his history of choice, that represented in Malcolm's history of   
Bosnia  , than is Owen by the history represented in West's epic travel narrative.  If 
Rebecca West's interpretation of history of   Yugoslavia  relies too heavily on myth, 
Noel Malcolm's is perhaps too quick to dismiss the powerful hold that past conflicts, 
wrongs, and humiliations have on the present--no matter how many generations 
removed.  As ethnic conflicts have proliferated over the last decade with the end of 
the Cold War, leaders and negotiators aiming to resolve those conflicts would do well 
to keep in mind that the ability to imagine a just peace requires a comprehensive and 
balanced view of the histories of the parties in conflict. However, peace planners 
beware of Trickster for his work is to ensure that such an imagining is, at least 
slightly, off-balance
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